1. Covert Security with Public Verifiability: Faster, Leaner, and Simpler 2019 Eurocrypt VerifiableComputation eprint.iacr.org
    Cheng Hong, Jonathan Katz, Vladimir Kolesnikov, Wen-jie Lu, and Xiao Wang

    The notion of covert security for secure two-party computation serves as a compromise between the traditional semi-honest and malicious security definitions. Roughly, covert security ensures that cheating behavior is detected by the honest party with reasonable probability. It provides more realistic guarantees than semi-honest security with significantly less overhead than is required by malicious security.


    The rationale for covert security is that it dissuades cheating by parties that care about their reputation and do not want to risk being caught. Further thought, however, shows that a much stronger disincentive is obtained if the honest party can generate a publicly verifiable certificate of misbehavior when cheating is detected. While the corresponding notion of publicly verifiable covert (PVC) security has been explored, existing PVC protocols are complex and less efficient than the best-known covert protocols, and have impractically large certificates.


    We propose a novel PVC protocol that significantly improves on prior work. Our protocol uses only ``off-the-shelf’’ primitives (in particular, it avoids signed oblivious transfer) and, for deterrence factor 1/2, has only 20-40% overhead (depending on the circuit size and network bandwidth) compared to state-of-the-art semi-honest protocols. Our protocol also has, for the first time, constant-size certificates of cheating (e.g., 354 bytes long at the 128-bit security level).


    As our protocol offers strong security guarantees with low overhead, we suggest that it is the best choice for many practical applications of secure two-party computation.

  2. xJsnark: A Framework for Efficient Verifiable Computation 2018 Oakland VerifiableComputation zkSNARK cs.umd.edu
    Ahmed Kosba, Charalampos Papamanthou and Elaine Shi

    Many cloud and cryptocurrency applications rely on verifying the integrity of outsourced computations, in which a verifier can efficiently verify the correctness of a computation made by an untrusted prover. State-of-the-art protocols for verifiable computation require that the computation task be expressed as arithmetic circuits, and the number of multiplication gates in the circuit is the primary metric that determines performance. At the present, a programmer could rely on two approaches for expressing the computation task, either by composing the circuits directly through low-level development tools; or by expressing the computation in a high-level program and rely on compilers to perform the program-to-circuit transformation. The former approach is difficult to use but on the other hand allows an expert programmer to perform custom optimizations that minimize the resulting circuit. In comparison, the latter approach is much more friendly to non-specialist users, but existing compilers often emit suboptimal circuits.


    We present xJsnark, a programming framework for verifiable computation that aims to achieve the best of both worlds: offering programmability to non-specialist users, and meanwhile automating the task of circuit size minimization through a combination of techniques. Specifically, we present new circuit-friendly algorithms for frequent operations that achieve constant to asymptotic savings over existing ones; various globally aware optimizations for short- and long- integer arithmetic; as well as circuit minimization techniques that allow us to reduce redundant computation over multiple expressions. We illustrate the savings in different applications, and show the framework’s applicability in developing large application circuits, such as ZeroCash, while minimizing the circuit size as in low-level implementations.

  3. vSQL: Verifying Arbitrary SQL Queries over Dynamic Outsourced Databases 2017 EncryptedDatabases Oakland VerifiableComputation web.eecs.umich.edu
    Y. Zhang, D. Genkin, J. Katz, D. Papadopoulos, C. Papamanthou

    Cloud database systems such as Amazon RDS or Google Cloud SQL enable the outsourcing of a large database to a server who then responds to SQL queries. A natural problem here is to efficiently verify the correctness of responses returned by the (untrusted) server. In this paper we present vSQL, a novel cryptographic protocol for publicly verifiable SQL queries on dynamic databases. At a high level, our construction relies on two extensions of the CMT interactive-proof protocol [Cormode et al., 2012]: (i) supporting outsourced input via the use of a polynomial-delegation protocol with succinct proofs, and (ii) supporting auxiliary input (i.e., non-deterministic computation) efficiently. Compared to previous verifiable-computation systems based on interactive proofs, our construction has verification cost polylogarithmic in the auxiliary input (which for SQL queries can be as large as the database) rather than linear. In order to evaluate the performance and expressiveness of our scheme, we tested it on SQL queries based on the 1PC-H benchmark on a database with 6 x 106 rows and 13 columns. The server overhead in our scheme (which is typically the main bottleneck) is up to 120 x lower than previous approaches based on succinct arguments of knowledge (SNARKs), and moreover we avoid the need for query-dependent pre-processing which is required by optimized SNARK-based schemes. In our construction, the server/client time and the communication cost are comparable to, and sometimes smaller than, those of existing customized solutions which only support specific queries.

  4. vRAM: Faster Verifiable RAM with Program-Independent Preprocessing 2018 Oakland VerifiableComputation ieeexplore.ieee.org
    Y. Zhang and D. Genkin and J. Katz and D. Papadopoulos and C. Papamanthou

    We study the problem of verifiable computation (VC) for RAM programs, where a computationally weak verifier outsources the execution of a program to a powerful (but untrusted) prover. Existing efficient implementations of VC protocols require an expensive preprocessing phase that binds the parties to a single circuit. (While there are schemes that avoid preprocessing entirely, their performance remains significantly worse than constructions with preprocessing.) Thus, a prover and verifier are forced to choose between two approaches: (1) Allow verification of arbitrary RAM programs, at the expense of efficiency, by preprocessing a universal circuit which can handle all possible instructions during each CPU cycle; or (2) Sacrifice expressiveness by preprocessing an efficient circuit which is tailored to the verification of a single specific RAM program.


    We present vRAM, a VC system for RAM programs that avoids both the above drawbacks by having a preprocessing phase that is entirely circuit-independent (other than an upper bound on the circuit size). During the proving phase, once the program to be verified and its inputs are chosen, the circuit-independence of our construction allows the parties to use a smaller circuit tailored to verifying the specific program on the chosen inputs, i.e., without needing to encode all possible instructions in each cycle. Moreover, our construction is the first with asymptotically optimal prover overhead; i.e., the work of the prover is a constant multiplicative factor of the time to execute the program.


    Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that vRAM reduces the prover’s memory consumption by 55-110x and its running time by 9-30x compared to existing schemes with universal preprocessing. This allows us to scale to RAM computations with more than 2 million CPU cycles, a 65x improvement compared to the state of the art. Finally, vRAM has performance comparable to (and sometimes better than) the best existing scheme with program-specific preprocessing despite the fact that the latter can deploy program-specific optimizations (and has to pay a separate preprocessing cost for every new program).