1. Security under Message-Derived Keys: Signcryption in iMessage 2020 AuthenticatedEncryption Eurocrypt PublicKeyEncryption SecureMessaging SymmetricKey eprint.iacr.org
    Mihir Bellare and Igors Stepanovs

    At the core of Apple’s iMessage is a signcryption scheme that involves symmetric encryption of a message under a key that is derived from the message itself. This motivates us to formalize a primitive we call Encryption under Message-Derived Keys (EMDK). We prove security of the EMDK scheme underlying iMessage. We use this to prove security of the signcryption scheme itself, with respect to definitions of signcryption we give that enhance prior ones to cover issues peculiar to messaging protocols. Our provable-security results are quantitative, and we discuss the practical implications for iMessage.

  2. Asymmetric Message Franking: Content Moderation for Metadata-Private End-to-End Encryption 2019 Crypto SecureMessaging eprint.iacr.org
    Nirvan Tyagi and Paul Grubbs and Julia Len and Ian Miers and Thomas Ristenpart

    Content moderation is crucial for stopping abuse and harassment via messaging on online platforms. Existing moderation mechanisms, such as message franking, require platform providers to see user identifiers on encrypted traffic. These mechanisms cannot be used in messaging systems in which users can hide their identities, such as Signal. The key technical challenge preventing moderation is in simultaneously achieving cryptographic accountability while preserving deniability. In this work, we resolve this tension with a new cryptographic primitive: asymmetric message franking schemes (AMFs). We define strong security notions for AMFs, including the first formal treatment of deniability in moderation settings. We then construct, analyze, and implement an AMF scheme that is fast enough for deployment. We detail how to use AMFs to build content moderation for metadata-private messaging.

  3. The Double Ratchet: Security Notions, Proofs, and Modularization for the Signal Protocol 2019 Eurocrypt SecureMessaging eprint.iacr.org
    Joël Alwen, Sandro Coretti, and Yevgeniy Dodis

    Signal is a famous secure messaging protocol used by billions of people, by virtue of many secure text messaging applications including Signal itself, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Skype, and Google Allo. At its core it uses the concept of “double ratcheting,” where every message is encrypted and authenticated using a fresh symmetric key; it has many attractive properties, such as forward security, post-compromise security, and “immediate (no-delay) decryption,” which had never been achieved in combination by prior messaging protocols.


    While the formal analysis of the Signal protocol, and ratcheting in general, has attracted a lot of recent attention, we argue that none of the existing analyses is fully satisfactory. To address this problem, we give a clean and general definition of secure messaging, which clearly indicates the types of security we expect, including forward security, post-compromise security, and immediate decryption. We are the first to explicitly formalize and model the immediate decryption property, which implies (among other things) that parties seamlessly recover if a given message is permanently lost—a property not achieved by any of the recent “provable alternatives to Signal.” We build a modular “generalized Signal protocol” from the following components: (a) continuous key agreement (CKA), a clean primitive we introduce and which can be easily and generically built from public-key encryption (not just Diffie-Hellman as is done in the current Signal protocol) and roughly models “public-key ratchets;” (b) forward-secure authenticated encryption with associated data (FS-AEAD), which roughly captures “symmetric-key ratchets;” and (c) a two-input hash function that is a pseudorandom function (resp. generator with input) in its first (resp. second) input, which we term PRF-PRNG. As a result, in addition to instantiating our framework in a way resulting in the existing, widely-used Diffie-Hellman based Signal protocol, we can easily get post-quantum security and not rely on random oracles in the analysis.


    We further show that our design can be elegantly extended to include other forms of “fine-grained state compromise” recently studied at CRYPTO’18, but without sacrificing the immediate decryption property. However, we argue that the additional security offered by these modifications is unlikely to justify the efficiency hit of using much heavier public-key cryptography in place of symmetric-key cryptography.

  4. Out-of-Band Authentication in Group Messaging: Computational, Statistical, Optimal 2018 Crypto SecureMessaging eprint.iacr.org
    Lior Rotem and Gil Segev

    Extensive efforts are currently put into securing messaging platforms, where a key challenge is that of protecting against man-in-the-middle attacks when setting up secure end-to-end channels. The vast majority of these efforts, however, have so far focused on securing user-to-user messaging, and recent attacks indicate that the security of group messaging is still quite fragile.


    We initiate the study of out-of-band authentication in the group setting, extending the user-to-user setting where messaging platforms (e.g., Telegram and WhatsApp) protect against man-in-the-middle attacks by assuming that users have access to an external channel for authenticating one short value (e.g., two users who recognize each other’s voice can compare a short value). Inspired by the frameworks of Vaudenay (CRYPTO ’05) and Naor et al. (CRYPTO ’06) in the user-to-user setting, we assume that users communicate over a completely-insecure channel, and that a group administrator can out-of-band authenticate one short message to all users. An adversary may read, remove, or delay this message (for all or for some of the users), but cannot undetectably modify it.


    Within our framework we establish tight bounds on the tradeoff between the adversary’s success probability and the length of the out-of-band authenticated message (which is a crucial bottleneck given that the out-of-band channel is of low bandwidth). We consider both computationally-secure and statistically-secure protocols, and for each flavor of security we construct an authentication protocol and prove a lower bound showing that our protocol achieves essentially the best possible tradeoff.


    In particular, considering groups that consist of an administrator and k
    additional users, for statistically-secure protocols we show that at least (k+1)⋅(log(1/ϵ)−Θ(1)) bits must be out-of-band authenticated, whereas for computationally-secure ones log(1/ϵ)+logk bits suffice, where ϵ is the adversary’s success probability. Moreover, instantiating our computationally-secure protocol in the random-oracle model yields an efficient and practically-relevant protocol (which, alternatively, can also be based on any one-way function in the standard model).

  5. Message Franking via Committing Authenticated Encryption 2017 Crypto SecureMessaging eprint.iacr.org
    Paul Grubbs, Jiahui Lu, Thomas Ristenpart

    We initiate the study of message franking, recently introduced in Facebook’s end-to-end encrypted message system. It targets verifiable reporting of abusive messages to Facebook without compromising security guarantees. We capture the goals of message franking via a new cryptographic primitive: compactly committing authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD). This is an AEAD scheme for which a small part of the ciphertext can be used as a cryptographic commitment to the message contents. Decryption provides, in addition to the message, a value that can be used to open the commitment. Security for franking mandates more than that required of traditional notions associated with commitment. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that AEAD schemes are in general not committing (compactly or otherwise), we prove that many in-use AEAD schemes can be used for message franking by using secret keys as openings. An implication of our results is the first proofs that several in-use symmetric encryption schemes are committing in the traditional sense. We also propose and analyze schemes that retain security even after openings are revealed to an adversary. One is a generalization of the scheme implicitly underlying Facebook’s message franking protocol, and another is a new construction that offers improved performance.

  6. Ratcheted Encryption and Key Exchange: The Security of Messaging 2017 Crypto SecureMessaging eprint.iacr.org
    Mihir Bellare and Asha Camper Singh and Joseph Jaeger and Maya Nyayapati and Igors Stepanovs

    We aim to understand, formalize and provably achieve the goals underlying the core key-ratcheting technique of Borisov, Goldberg and Brewer, extensions of which are now used in secure messaging systems. We give syntax and security definitions for ratcheted encryption and key-exchange. We give a proven-secure protocol for ratcheted key exchange. We then show how to generically obtain ratcheted encryption from ratcheted key-exchange and standard encryption.

  7. On Ends-to-Ends Encryption: Asynchronous Group Messaging with Strong Security Guarantees 2018 CCS SecureMessaging people.cispa.io
    Katriel Cohn-Gordon, Cas Cremers, Luke Garratt, Jon Millican, and Kevin Milner

    In the past few years secure messaging has become mainstream, with over a billion active users of end-to-end encryption protocols such as Signal. The Signal Protocol provides a strong property called post-compromise security to its users. However, it turns out that many of its implementations provide, without notification, a weaker property for group messaging: an adversary who compromises a single group member can read and inject messages indefinitely. We show for the first time that post-compromise security can be achieved in realistic, asynchronous group messaging systems. We present a design called Asynchronous Ratcheting Trees (ART), which uses tree-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange to allow a group of users to derive a shared symmetric key even if no two are ever online at the same time. ART scales to groups containing thousands of members, while still providing provable security guarantees. It has seen significant interest from industry, and forms the basis for two draft IETF RFCs and a chartered working group. Our results show that strong security guarantees for group messaging are practically achievable in a modern setting.

  8. Traceback for End-to-End Encrypted Messaging 2019 CCS SecureMessaging eprint.iacr.org
    Nirvan Tyagi, Ian Miers and Thomas Ristenpart

    Messaging systems are used to spread misinformation and other malicious content, often with dire consequences. End-to-end encryption improves privacy but hinders content-based moderation and, in particular, obfuscates the original source of malicious content. We introduce the idea of message traceback, a new cryptographic approach that enables platforms to simultaneously provide end-to-end encryption while also being able to track down the source of malicious content reported by users. We formalize functionality and security goals for message traceback, and detail two constructions that allow revealing a chain of forwarded messages (path traceback) or the entire forwarding tree (tree traceback). We implement and evaluate prototypes of our traceback schemes to highlight their practicality, and provide a discussion of deployment considerations.

  9. SEEMless: Secure End-to-End Encrypted Messaging with less trust 2019 CCS SecureMessaging eprint.iacr.org
    Melissa Chase, Apoorvaa Deshpande, Esha Ghosh and Harjasleen Malvai

    End-to-end encrypted messaging (E2E) is only secure if participants have a way to retrieve the correct public key for the desired recipient. However, to make these systems usable, users must be able to replace their keys (e.g. when they lose or reset their devices, or reinstall their app), and we cannot assume any cryptographic means of authenticating the new keys. In the current E2E systems, the service provider manages the directory of public keys of its registered users; this allows a compromised or coerced service provider to introduce their own keys and execute a man in the middle attack.


    Building on the approach of CONIKS (Melara et al, USENIX Security `15), we formalize the notion of a Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Key Directory (VKD): a system which allows users to monitor the keys that the service is distributing on their behalf. We then propose a new VKD scheme which we call SEEMless, which improves on prior work in terms of privacy and scalability. In particular, our new approach allows key changes to take effect almost immediately; we show experimentally that our scheme easily supports delays less than a minute, in contrast to previous work which proposes a delay of one hour.