Papers tagged as PSI
  1. PSI from PaXoS: Fast, Malicious Private Set Intersection 2020 Eurocrypt PSI
    Benny Pinkas, Mike Rosulek and Ni Trieu and Avishay Yanai

    We present a 2-party private set intersection (PSI) protocol which provides security against malicious participants, yet is almost as fast as the fastest known semi-honest PSI protocol of Kolesnikov et al. (CCS 2016).

    Our protocol is based on a new approach for two-party PSI, which can be instantiated to provide security against either malicious or semi-honest adversaries. The protocol is unique in that the only difference between the semi-honest and malicious versions is an instantiation with different parameters for a linear error-correction code. It is also the first PSI protocol which is concretely efficient while having linear communication and security against malicious adversaries, while running in the OT-hybrid model (assuming a non-programmable random oracle).

    State of the art semi-honest PSI protocols take advantage of cuckoo hashing, but it has proven a challenge to use cuckoo hashing for malicious security. Our protocol is the first to use cuckoo hashing for malicious-secure PSI. We do so via a new data structure, called a probe-and-XOR of strings (PaXoS), which may be of independent interest. This abstraction captures important properties of previous data structures, most notably garbled Bloom filters. While an encoding by a garbled Bloom filter is larger by a factor of $O(\lambda)$ than the original data, we describe a significantly improved PaXoS based on cuckoo hashing that achieves constant rate while being no worse in other relevant efficiency measures.

  2. Practical Multi-party Private Set Intersection from Symmteric-Key Techniques 2017 CCS MPC PSI
    Vladimir Kolesnikov, Naor Matania, Benny Pinkas, Mike Rosulek, and Ni Trieu

    We present a new paradigm for multi-party private set intersection (PSI) that allows $n$ parties to compute the intersection of their datasets without revealing any additional information. We explore a variety of instantiations of this paradigm. Our protocols avoid computationally expensive public-key operations and are secure in the presence of any number of semi-honest participants (i.e., without an honest majority).

    We demonstrate the practicality of our protocols with an implementation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of a multi-party PSI protocol. For 5 parties with data-sets of 220 items each, our protocol requires only 72 seconds. In an optimization achieving a slightly weaker variant of security (augmented semi-honest model), the same task requires only 22 seconds.

    The technical core of our protocol is oblivious evaluation of a programmable pseudorandom function (OPPRF), which we instantiate in three different ways. We believe our new OPPRF abstraction and constructions may be of independent interest.

  3. Malicious Secure Private Set Intersection via Dual Execution 2017 CCS Implementation PSI
    Peter Rindal and Mike Rosulek

    Private set intersection (PSI) allows two parties, who each hold a set of items, to compute the intersection of those sets without revealing anything about other items. Recent advances in PSI have significantly improved its performance for the case of semi-honest security, making semi-honest PSI a practical alternative to insecure methods for computing intersections. However, the semi-honest security model is not always a good fit for real-world problems.

    In this work we introduce a new PSI protocol that is secure in the presence of malicious adversaries. Our protocol is based entirely on fast symmetric-key primitives and inherits important techniques from state-of-the-art protocols in the semi-honest setting. Our novel technique to strengthen the protocol for malicious adversaries is inspired by the dual execution technique of Mohassel & Franklin (PKC 2006). Our protocol is optimized for the random-oracle model, but can also be realized (with a performance penalty) in the standard model.

    We demonstrate our protocol’s practicality with a prototype implementation. To securely compute the intersection of two sets of size 220 requires only 13 seconds with our protocol, which is ~12x faster than the previous best malicious-secure protocol (Rindal & Rosulek, Eurocrypt 2017), and only 3x slower than the best semi-honest protocol (Kolesnikov et al., CCS 2016).

  4. Fast Private Set Intersection from Homorphic Encryption 2017 CCS PSI
    Hao Chen, Kim Laine, and Peter Rindal

    Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a cryptographic technique that allows two parties to compute the intersection of their sets without revealing anything except the intersection. We use fully homomorphic encryption to construct a fast PSI protocol with a small communication overhead that works particularly well when one of the two sets is much smaller than the other, and is secure against semi-honest adversaries.

    The most computationally efficient PSI protocols have been constructed using tools such as hash functions and oblivious transfer, but a potential limitation with these approaches is the communication complexity, which scales linearly with the size of the larger set. This is of particular concern when performing PSI between a constrained device (cellphone) holding a small set, and a large service provider (e.g. WhatsApp), such as in the Private Contact Discovery application.

    Our protocol has communication complexity linear in the size of the smaller set, and logarithmic in the larger set. More precisely, if the set sizes are Ny < Nx, we achieve a communication overhead of O(Ny log Nx). Our running-time-optimized benchmarks show that it takes 36 seconds of online-computation, 71 seconds of non-interactive (receiver-independent) pre-processing, and only 12.5MB of round trip communication to intersect five thousand 32-bit strings with 16 million 32-bit strings. Compared to prior works, this is roughly a 38–115x reduction in communication with minimal difference in computational overhead.

  5. Labeled PSI from Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Malicious Security 2018 CCS FHE PSI
    Hao Chen, Zhicong Huang, Kim Laine and Peter Rindal

    Private Set Intersection (PSI) allows two parties, the sender and the receiver, to compute the intersection of their private sets without revealing extra information to each other. We are interested in the {\it unbalanced} PSI setting, where (1) the receiver’s set is significantly smaller than the sender’s, and (2) the receiver (with the smaller set) has a low-power device. Also, in a {\it Labeled PSI} setting, the sender holds a label per each item in its set, and the receiver obtains the labels from the items in the intersection. We build upon the unbalanced PSI protocol of Chen, Laine, and Rindal (CCS 2017) in several ways: we add efficient support for arbitrary length items, we construct and implement an unbalanced Labeled PSI protocol with small communication complexity, and also strengthen the security model using Oblivious Pseudo-Random Function (OPRF) in a pre-processing phase. Our protocols outperform previous ones: for an intersection of 220 and 512 size sets of arbitrary length items our protocol has a total online running time of just 1 second (single thread), and a total communication cost of 4 MB. For a larger example, an intersection of 228 and 1024 size sets of arbitrary length items has an online running time of 12 seconds (multi-threaded), with less than 18 MB of total communication.

  6. Faster Unbalanced Private Set Intersection 2018 FinancialCryptography Privacy PSI
    Amanda Cristina Davi Resende and Diego de Freitas Aranha

    Protocols for Private Set Intersection (PSI) are important cryptographic primitives that perform joint operations on datasets in a privacy-preserving way. They allow two parties to compute the intersection of their private sets without revealing any additional information beyond the intersection itself. Unfortunately, PSI implementations in the literature do not usually employ the best possible cryptographic implementation techniques. This results in protocols presenting computational and communication complexities that are prohibitive, particularly in the case when one of the participants is a low-powered device and there are bandwidth restrictions. This paper builds on modern cryptographic engineering techniques and proposes optimizations for a promising one-way PSI protocol based on public-key cryptography. For the case when one of the parties holds a set much smaller than the other (a realistic assumption in many scenarios) we show that our improvements and optimizations yield a protocol that outperforms the communication complexity and the run time of previous proposals by around one thousand times.

  7. SpOT-Light: Lightweight Private Set Intersection from Sparse OT Extension 2019 Crypto PSI
    Benny Pinkas and Mike Rosulek and Ni Trieu and Avishay Yanai

    We describe a novel approach for two-party private set intersection (PSI) with semi-honest security. Compared to existing PSI protocols, ours has a more favorable balance between communication and computation. Specifically, our protocol has the lowest monetary cost of any known PSI protocol, when run over the Internet using cloud-based computing services (taking into account current rates for CPU + data). On slow networks (e.g., 10Mbps) our protocol is actually the fastest.

    Our novel underlying technique is a variant of oblivious transfer (OT) extension that we call sparse OT extension. Conceptually it can be thought of as a communication-efficient multipoint oblivious PRF evaluation. Our sparse OT technique relies heavily on manipulating high-degree polynomials over large finite fields (i.e. elements whose representation requires hundreds of bits). We introduce extensive algorithmic and engineering improvements for interpolation and multi-point evaluation of such polynomials, which we believe will be of independent interest.

    Finally, we present an extensive empirical comparison of state-of-the- art PSI protocols in several application scenarios and along several dimensions of measurement: running time, communication, peak memory consumption, and — arguably the most relevant metric for practice — monetary cost

  8. Efficient Circuit-based PSI with Linear Communication 2019 Eurocrypt PSI
    Benny Pinkas and Thomas Schneider, Oleksandr Tkachenko, and Avishay Yanai

    We present a new protocol for computing a circuit which implements the private set intersection functionality (PSI). Using circuits for this task is advantageous over the usage of specific protocols for PSI, since many applications of PSI do not need to compute the intersection itself but rather functions based on the items in the intersection. Our protocol is the first circuit-based PSI protocol to achieve linear communication complexity. It is also concretely more efficient than all previous circuit-based PSI protocols. For example, for sets of size 2^20 it improves the communication of the recent work of Pinkas et al. (EUROCRYPT’18) by more than 10 times, and improves the run time by a factor of 2.8x in the LAN setting, and by a factor of 5.8x in the WAN setting. Our protocol is based on the usage of a protocol for computing oblivious programmable pseudo-random functions (OPPRF), and more specifically on our technique to amortize the cost of batching together multiple invocations of OPPRF.

  9. Efficient Circuit-based PSI via Cuckoo Hashing 2018 Eurocrypt MPC PSI
    Benny Pinkas, Thomas Schneider, Christian Weinert, and Udi Wieder

    While there has been a lot of progress in designing efficient custom protocols for computing Private Set Intersection (PSI), there has been less research on using generic Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols for this task. However, there are many variants of the set intersection functionality that are not addressed by the existing custom PSI solutions and are easy to compute with generic MPC protocols (e.g., comparing the cardinality of the intersection with a threshold or measuring ad conversion rates).

    Generic PSI protocols work over circuits that compute the intersection. For sets of size n, the best known circuit constructions conduct O(nlogn) or O(nlogn/loglogn) comparisons (Huang et al., NDSS’12 and Pinkas et al., USENIX Security’15). In this work, we propose new circuit-based protocols for computing variants of the intersection with an almost linear number of comparisons. Our constructions are based on new variants of Cuckoo hashing in two dimensions.

    We present an asymptotically efficient protocol as well as a protocol with better concrete efficiency. For the latter protocol, we determine the required sizes of tables and circuits experimentally, and show that the run-time is concretely better than that of existing constructions.

    The protocol can be extended to a larger number of parties. The proof technique for analyzing Cuckoo hashing in two dimensions is new and can be generalized to analyzing standard Cuckoo hashing as well as other new variants of it.

  10. Improved Private Set Intersection against Malicious Adversaries 2017 Eurocrypt PSI
    Peter Rindal and Mike Rosulek

    Private set intersection (PSI) refers to a special case of secure two-party computation in which the parties each have a set of items and compute the intersection of these sets without revealing any additional information. In this paper we present improvements to practical PSI providing security in the presence of {\em malicious} adversaries. Our starting point is the protocol of Dong, Chen & Wen (CCS 2013) that is based on Bloom filters. We identify a bug in their malicious-secure variant and show how to fix it using a cut-and-choose approach that has low overhead while simultaneously avoiding one the main computational bottleneck in their original protocol. We also point out some subtleties that arise when using Bloom filters in malicious-secure cryptographic protocols. We have implemented our PSI protocols and report on its performance. Our improvements reduce the cost of Dong et al.’s protocol by a factor of 14−110× on a single thread. When compared to the previous fastest protocol of De Cristofaro et al., we improve the running time by 8−24×. For instance, our protocol has an online time of 14 seconds and an overall time of 2.1 minutes to securely compute the intersection of two sets of 1 million items each.

  11. Two-party Private Set Intersection with an Untrusted Third Party 2019 CCS PSI
    Phi Hung Le, Samuel Ranellucci and S. Dov Gordon

    We construct new protocols for two parties to securely compute on the items in their intersection. Our protocols make use of an untrusted third party that has no input. The use of this party allows us to construct highly efficient protocols that are secure against a single malicious corruption.