Papers tagged as Measurement
  1. DROWN: Breaking TLS using SSLv2 2016 Attacks KeyExchange Measurement Network Protocols TLS Usenix
    Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel, Juraj Somorovsky, Nadia Heninger, Maik Dankel, Jens Steube, Luke Valenta, David Adrian, J. Alex Halderman, Viktor Dukhovni, Emilia Käsper, Shaanan Cohney, Susanne Engels, Christof Paar, and Yuval Shavitt

    We present DROWN, a novel cross-protocol attack on TLS that uses a server supporting SSLv2 as an oracle to decrypt modern TLS connections.
    We introduce two versions of the attack. The more general form exploits multiple unnoticed protocol flaws in SSLv2 to develop a new and stronger variant of the Bleichenbacher RSA padding-oracle attack. To decrypt a 2048-bit RSA TLS ciphertext, an attacker must observe
    1,000 TLS handshakes, initiate 40,000 SSLv2 connections, and perform 2^50 offline work. The victim client never initiates SSLv2 connections. We implemented the attack and can decrypt a TLS 1.2 handshake using 2048-bit RSA in under 8 hours, at a cost of $440 on Amazon EC2. Using Internet-wide scans, we find that 33% of all HTTPS servers and 22% of those with browser-trusted certificates are vulnerable to this protocol-level attack due
    to widespread key and certificate reuse.
    For an even cheaper attack, we apply our new techniques together with a newly discovered vulnerability in OpenSSL that was present in releases from 1998 to early 2015. Given an unpatched SSLv2 server to use as an oracle, we can decrypt a TLS ciphertext in one minute on a single CPU - fast enough to enable man-in-the-middle attacks against modern browsers. We find that 26% of HTTPS servers are vulnerable to this attack.
    We further observe that the QUIC protocol is vulnerable to a variant of our attack that allows an attacker to impersonate a server indefinitely after performing as few as 2^17 SSLv2 connections and 2^58 offline work.
    We conclude that SSLv2 is not only weak, but actively harmful to the TLS ecosystem.

  2. "I Have No Idea What I'm Doing" - On the Usability of Deploying HTTPS 2017 Measurement TLS Usenix
    Katharina Krombholz, Wilfried Mayer, Martin Schmiedecker, and Edgar Weippl

    Protecting communication content at scale is a difficult task, and TLS is the protocol most commonly used to do so. However, it has been shown that deploying it in a truly secure fashion is challenging for a large fraction of online service operators. While Let’s Encrypt was specifically built and launched to promote the adoption of HTTPS, this paper aims to understand the reasons for why it has been so hard to deploy TLS correctly and studies the usability of the deployment process for HTTPS. We performed a series of experiments with 28 knowledgable participants and revealed significant usability challenges that result in weak TLS configurations. Additionally, we conducted expert interviews with 7 experienced security auditors. Our results suggest that the deployment process is far too complex even for people with proficient knowledge in the field, and that server configurations should have stronger security by default. While the results from our expert interviews confirm the ecological validity of the lab study results, they additionally highlight that even educated users prefer solutions that are easy to use. An improved and less vulnerable workflow would be very beneficial to finding stronger configurations in the wild.

  3. Measuring HTTPS Adoption on the Web 2017 Measurement TLS Usenix
    Adrienne Porter Felt, Richard Barnes, April King, Chris Palmer, Chris Bentzel, and Parisa Tabriz

    HTTPS ensures that the Web has a base level of privacy and integrity. Security engineers, researchers, and browser vendors have long worked to spread HTTPS to as much of the Web as possible via outreach efforts, developer tools, and browser changes. How much progress have we made toward this goal of widespread HTTPS adoption? We gather metrics to benchmark the status and progress of HTTPS adoption on the Web in 2017. To evaluate HTTPS adoption from a user perspective, we collect large-scale, aggregate user metrics from two major browsers (Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox). To measure HTTPS adoption from a Web developer perspective, we survey server support for HTTPS among top and long-tail websites. We draw on these metrics to gain insight into the current state of the HTTPS ecosystem.

  4. The use of TLS in Censorship Circumvention 2019 Censorship Measurement NDSS TLS
    Sergey Frolov and Eric Wustrow

    TLS, the Transport Layer Security protocol, has
    quickly become the most popular protocol on the Internet, already
    used to load over 70% of web pages in Mozilla Firefox. Due
    to its ubiquity, TLS is also a popular protocol for censorship
    circumvention tools, including Tor and Signal, among others.

    However, the wide range of features supported in TLS makes
    it possible to distinguish implementations from one another by
    what set of cipher suites, elliptic curves, signature algorithms, and
    other extensions they support. Already, censors have used deep
    packet inspection (DPI) to identify and block popular circumven-
    tion tools based on the fingerprint of their TLS implementation.

    In response, many circumvention tools have attempted to
    mimic popular TLS implementations such as browsers, but this
    technique has several challenges. First, it is burdensome to keep
    up with the rapidly-changing browser TLS implementations, and
    know what fingerprints would be good candidates to mimic.
    Second, TLS implementations can be difficult to mimic correctly,
    as they offer many features that may not be supported by the
    relatively lightweight libraries used in typical circumvention tools.
    Finally, dependency changes and updates to the underlying li-
    braries can silently impact what an application’s TLS fingerprint
    looks like, making it difficult for tools to control.

    In this paper, we collect and analyze real-world TLS traffic
    from over 11.8 billion TLS connections over 9 months to identify
    a wide range of TLS client implementations actually used on
    the Internet. We use our data to analyze TLS implementations
    of several popular censorship circumvention tools, including
    Lantern, Psiphon, Signal, Outline, Tapdance, and Tor (Snowflake
    and meek). We find that the many of these tools use TLS
    configurations that are easily distinguishable from the real-world
    traffic they attempt to mimic, even when these tools have put
    effort into parroting popular TLS implementations.

    To address this problem, we have developed a library, uTLS,
    that enables tool maintainers to automatically mimic other pop-
    ular TLS implementations. Using our real-world traffic dataset,
    we observe many popular TLS implementations we are able to
    correctly mimic with uTLS, and we describe ways our tool can
    more flexibly adopt to the dynamic TLS ecosystem with minimal
    manual effort.

  5. The Security Impact of HTTPS Interception 2017 Measurement NDSS TLS
    Z. Durumeric and Z. Ma and D. Springall and R. Barnes and N. Sullivan and E. Bursztein and M. Bailey and J. A. Halderman and V. Paxson

    As HTTPS deployment grows, middlebox and antivirus products are increasingly intercepting TLS connections to retain visibility into network traffic. In this work, we present a comprehensive study on the prevalence and impact of HTTPS interception. First, we show that web servers can detect interception by identifying a mismatch between the HTTP User-Agent header and TLS client behavior. We characterize the TLS handshakes of major browsers and popular interception products, which we use to build a set of heuristics to detect interception and identify the responsible product. We deploy these heuristics at three large network providers: (1) Mozilla Firefox update servers, (2) a set of popular e-commerce sites, and (3) the Cloudflare content distribution network. We find more than an order of magnitude more interception than previously estimated and with dramatic impact on connection security. To understand why security suffers, we investigate popular middleboxes and clientside security software, finding that nearly all reduce connection security and many introduce severe vulnerabilities. Drawing on our measurements, we conclude with a discussion on recent proposals to safely monitor HTTPS and recommendations for the security community.

  6. Measuring small subgroup attacks against Diffie-Hellman 2017 Attacks Diffie-Hellman IPSec Measurement NDSS TLS
    Luke Valenta and David Adrian and Antonio Sanso and Shaanan Cohney and Joshua Fried and Marcella Hastings and J. Alex Halderman and Nadia Heninger

    Several recent standards, including NIST SP 800- 56A and RFC 5114, advocate the use of “DSA” parameters for Diffie-Hellman key exchange. While it is possible to use such parameters securely, additional validation checks are necessary to prevent well-known and potentially devastating attacks. In this paper, we observe that many Diffie-Hellman implementations do not properly validate key exchange inputs. Combined with other protocol properties and implementation choices, this can radically decrease security. We measure the prevalence of these parameter choices in the wild for HTTPS, POP3S, SMTP with STARTTLS, SSH, IKEv1, and IKEv2, finding millions of hosts using DSA and other non-“safe” primes for Diffie-Hellman key exchange, many of them in combination with potentially vulnerable behaviors. We examine over 20 open-source cryptographic libraries and applications and observe that until January 2016, not a single one validated subgroup orders by default. We found feasible full or partial key recovery vulnerabilities in OpenSSL, the Exim mail server, the Unbound DNS client, and Amazon’s load balancer, as well as susceptibility to weaker attacks in many other applications.