1. Machine-Checked Proofs for Cryptographic Standards 2019 CCS CryptoStandards MachineCheckedProof eprint.iacr.org
    José Bacelar Almeida, Cécile Baritel-Ruet, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, François Dupressoir, Benjamin Grégoire, Vincent Laporte, Tiago Oliveira, Alley Stoughton and Pierre-Yves Strub

    We present a high-assurance and high-speed implementation of the SHA-3 hash function. Our implementation is written in the Jasmin programming language, and is formally verified for functional correctness, provable security and timing attack resistance in the EasyCrypt proof assistant. Our implementation is the first to achieve simultaneously the four desirable properties (efficiency, correctness, provable security, and side-channel protection) for a non-trivial cryptographic primitive. Concretely, our mechanized proofs show that: 1) the SHA-3 hash function is indifferentiable from a random oracle, and thus is resistant against collision, first and second preimage attacks; 2) the SHA-3 hash function is correctly implemented by a vectorized x86 implementation. Furthermore, the implementation is provably protected against timing attacks in an idealized model of timing leaks. The proofs include new EasyCrypt libraries of independent interest for programmable random oracles and modular indifferentiability proofs.

  2. A Machine-Checked Proof of Security for AWS Key Management Service 2019 CCS MachineCheckedProof PKI eprint.iacr.org
    José Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Matthew Campagna, Ernie Cohen, Benjamin Gregoire, Vitor Pereira, Bernardo Portela, Pierre-Yves Strub and Serdar Tasiran

    We present a machine-checked proof of security for the domain management protocol of Amazon Web Services’ KMS (Key Management Service) a critical security service used throughout AWS and by AWS customers. Domain management is at the core of AWS KMS; it governs the top-level keys that anchor the security of encryption services at AWS. We show that the protocol securely implements an ideal distributed encryption mechanism under standard cryptographic assumptions. The proof is machine-checked in the EasyCrypt proof assistant and is the largest EasyCrypt development to date.

  3. A High-Assurance Evaluator for Machine-Checked Secure Multiparty Computation 2019 CCS MachineCheckedProof MPC eprint.iacr.org
    Karim Eldefrawy and Vitor Pereira

    Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) enables a group of n distrusting parties to jointly compute a function using private inputs. MPC guarantees correctness of computation and confidentiality of inputs if no more than a threshold t of the parties are corrupted. Proactive MPC (PMPC) addresses the stronger threat model of a mobile adversary that controls a changing set of parties (but only up to t at any instant), and may eventually corrupt all n parties over a long time.

    This paper takes a first stab at developing high-assurance implementations of (P)MPC. We formalize in EasyCrypt, a tool-assisted framework for building high-confidence cryptographic proofs, several abstract and reusable variations of secret sharing and of (P)MPC protocols building on them. Using those, we prove a series of abstract theorems for the proactive setting. We implement and perform computer-checked security proofs of concrete instantiations of the required (abstract) protocols in EasyCrypt.

    We also develop a new tool-chain to extract high-assurance executable implementations of protocols formalized and verified in EasyCrypt. Our tool-chain uses Why as an intermediate tool, and enables us to extract executable code from our (P)MPC formalizations. We conduct an evaluation of the extracted executables by comparing their performance to performance of manually implemented versions using Python-based Charm framework for prototyping cryptographic schemes. We argue that the small overhead of our high-assurance executables is a reasonable price to pay for the increased confidence about their correctness and security.