1. Formal Modeling and Verification for Domain Validation and ACME 2017 FinancialCryptography FormalVerification fc17.ifca.ai
    Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Nadim Kobeissi

    Web traffic encryption has shifted from applying only to highly sensitive websites (such as banks) to a majority of all Web requests. Until recently, one of the main limiting factors for enabling HTTPS is the requirement to obtain a valid certificate from a trusted certification authority, a tedious process that typically involves fees and ad-hoc key generation, certificate request and domain validation procedures. To remove this barrier of entry, the Internet Security Research Group created Let’s Encrypt, a new non-profit certificate authority which uses a new protocol called Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) to automate certificate management at all levels (request, validation , issuance, renewal, and revocation) between clients (website operators) and servers (certificate authority nodes). Let’s Encrypt’s success is measured by its issuance of over 12 million free certificates since its launch in April 2016. In this paper, we survey the existing process for issuing domain-validated certificates in major certification authorities to build a security model of domain-validated certificate issuance. We then model the ACME protocol in the applied pi-calculus and verify its stated security goals against our threat model of domain validation. We compare the effective security of different domain validation methods and show that ACME can be secure under a stronger threat model than that of traditional CAs. We also uncover weaknesses in some flows of ACME 1.0 and propose verified improvements that have been adopted in the latest protocol draft submitted to the IETF.

  2. Formal Verification of Masked Hardware Implementations in the Presence of Glitches 2018 Eurocrypt FormalVerification eprint.iacr.org
    Roderick Bloem, Hannes Gross, Rinat Iusupov, Bettina Könighofer, Stefan Mangard, and Johannes Winter

    Masking provides a high level of resistance against side-channel analysis. However, in practice there are many possible pitfalls when masking schemes are applied, and implementation flaws are easily overlooked. Over the recent years, the formal verification of masked software implementations has made substantial progress. In contrast to software implementations, hardware implementations are inherently susceptible to glitches. Therefore, the same methods tailored for software implementations are not readily applicable. In this work, we introduce a method to formally verify the security of masked hardware implementations that takes glitches into account. Our approach does not require any intermediate modeling steps of the targeted implementation and is not bound to a certain leakage model. The verification is performed directly on the circuit’s netlist, and covers also higher-order and multivariate flaws. Therefore, a sound but conservative estimation of the Fourier coefficients of each gate in the netlist is calculated, which characterize statistical dependence of the gates on the inputs and thus allow to predict possible leakages. In contrast to existing practical evaluations, like t-tests, this formal verification approach makes security statements beyond specific measurement methods, the number of evaluated leakage traces, and the evaluated devices. Furthermore, flaws detected by the verifier are automatically localized. We have implemented our method on the basis of an SMT solver and demonstrate the suitability on a range of correctly and incorrectly protected circuits of different masking schemes and for different protection orders. Our verifier is efficient enough to prove the security of a full masked AES S-box, and of the Keccak S-box up to the third protection order.

  3. Attribute-Based Encryption in the Generic Group Model: Automated Proofs and New Constructions 2017 ABE CCS FormalVerification acmccs.github.io
    Miguel Ambrona, Gillis Barthe, Romain Gay, and Hoeteck Wee

    Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a cryptographic primitive which supports fine-grained access control on encrypted data, making it an appealing building block for many applications. In this paper, we propose, implement, and evaluate fully automated methods for proving security of ABE in the Generic Bilinear Group Model (Boneh, Boyen, and Goh, 2005, Boyen, 2008), an idealized model which admits simpler and more efficient constructions, and can also be used to find attacks. Our method is applicable to Rational-Fraction Induced ABE, a large class of ABE that contains most of the schemes from the literature, and relies on a Master Theorem, which reduces security in the GGM to a (new) notion of symbolic security, which is amenable to automated verification using constraint-based techniques. We relate our notion of symbolic security for Rational-Fraction Induced ABE to prior notions for Pair Encodings. Finally, we present several applications, including automated proofs for new schemes.

  4. Signed Cryptographic Program Verification with Typed CryptoLine 2019 CCS FormalVerification precision.moscito.org
    Yu-Fu Fu, Jiaxiang Liu, Xiaomu Shi, Ming-Hsien Tsai, Bow-Yaw Wang, and Bo-Yin Yang

    We develop an automated formal technique to specify and verify signed computation in cryptographic programs. In addition to new instructions, we introduce a type system to detect type errors in programs. A type inference algorithm is also provided to deduce types and instruction variants in cryptographic programs. In order to verify signed cryptographic C programs, we develop a translator from the GCC intermediate representation to our language. Using our technique, we have verified 82 C functions in cryptography libraries including NaCl, wolfSSL, bitcoin, OpenSSL, and BoringSSL.

  5. Component-Based Formal Analysis of 5G-AKA: Channel Assumptions and Session Confusion 2019 5G CellularProtocols FormalVerification NDSS ndss-symposium.org
    Cas Cremers and Martin Dehnel-Wild

    The 5G mobile telephony standards are nearing completion; upon adoption these will be used by billions across the globe. Ensuring the security of 5G communication is of the utmost importance, building trust in a critical component of everyday life and national infrastructure.

    We perform a fine-grained formal analysis of 5G’s main authentication and key agreement protocol (5G-AKA), and provide the first models that explicitly consider all parties defined by the protocol specification. Our formal analysis reveals that the security of 5G-AKA critically relies on unstated assumptions on the inner workings of the underlying channels. In practice this means that following the 5G-AKA specification, a provider can easily and ‘correctly’ implement the standard insecurely, leaving the protocol vulnerable to a security-critical race condition. We then provide the first models and analysis considering component and channel compromise in 5G, the results of which further demonstrate the fragility and subtle trust assumptions of the 5G-AKA protocol.

    We propose formally verified fixes to the encountered issues, and we have worked with 3GPP to ensure that these fixes are adopted.

  6. Analyzing Semantic Correctness with Symbolic Execution: A Case Study on PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Verification 2019 FormalVerification NDSS Signatures ndss-symposium.org
    Sze Yiu Chau and Moosa Yahyazadeh and Omar Chowdhury and Aniket Kate and Ninghui Li

    We discuss how symbolic execution can be used to not only find low-level errors but also analyze the semantic correctness of protocol implementations. To avoid manually crafting test cases, we propose a strategy of meta-level search, which leverages constraints stemmed from the input formats to automatically generate concolic test cases. Additionally, to aid root-cause analysis, we develop constraint provenance tracking (CPT), a mechanism that associates atomic sub-formulas of path constraints with their corresponding source level origins. We demonstrate the power of symbolic analysis with a case study on PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification. Leveraging meta-level search and CPT, we analyzed 15 recent open-source implementations using symbolic execution and found semantic flaws in 6 of them. Further analysis of these flaws showed that 4 implementations are susceptible to new variants of the Bleichenbacher low- exponent RSA signature forgery. One implementation suffers from potential denial of service attacks with purposefully crafted signatures. All our findings have been responsibly shared with the affected vendors. Among the flaws discovered, 6 new CVEs have been assigned to the immediately exploitable ones.

  7. Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate 2017 FormalVerification Oakland TLS prosecco.gforge.inria.fr
    Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Bruno Blanchet, and Nadim Kobeissi

    TLS 1.3 is the next version of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Its clean-slate design is a reaction both to the increasing demand for low-latency HTTPS connections and to a series of recent high-profile attacks on TLS. The hope is that a fresh protocol with modern cryptography will prevent legacy problems, the danger is that it will expose new kinds of attacks, or reintroduce old flaws that were fixed in previous versions of TLS. After 18 drafts, the protocol is nearing completion, and the working group has appealed to researchers to analyze the protocol before publication. This paper responds by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the TLS 1.3 Draft-18 protocol. We seek to answer three questions that have not been fully addressed in previous work on TLS 1.3: (1) Does TLS 1.3 prevent well-known attacks on TLS 1.2, such as Logjam or the Triple Handshake, even if it is run in parallel with TLS 1.2? (2) Can we mechanically verify the computational security of TLS 1.3 under standard (strong) assumptions on its cryptographic primitives? (3) How can we extend the guarantees of the TLS 1.3 protocol to the details of its implementations? To answer these questions, we propose a methodology for developing verified symbolic and computational models of TLS 1.3 hand-in-hand with a high-assurance reference implementation of the protocol. We present symbolic ProVerif models for various intermediate versions of TLS 1.3 and evaluate them against a rich class of attacks to reconstruct both known and previously unpublished vulnerabilities that influenced the current design of the protocol. We present a computational CryptoVerif model for TLS 1.3 Draft-18 and prove its security. We present RefTLS, an interoperable implementation of TLS 1.0-1.3 and automatically analyze its protocol core by extracting a ProVerif model from its typed JavaScript code.

  8. Implementing and Proving the TLS 1.3 Record Layer 2017 FormalVerification Oakland TLS eprint.iacr.org
    A. Delignat-Lavaud, C. Fournet, M. Kohlweiss, J. Protzenko, A. Rastogi, N. Swamy, S. Zanella-Beguelin, K. Bhargavan, J. Pan, and J. K. Zinzindohoue

    The record layer is the main bridge between TLS applications and internal sub-protocols. Its core functionality is an elaborate form of authenticated encryption: streams of messages for each sub-protocol (handshake, alert, and application data) are fragmented, multiplexed, and encrypted with optional padding to hide their lengths. Conversely, the sub-protocols may provide fresh keys or signal stream termination to the record layer. Compared to prior versions, TLS 1.3 discards obsolete schemes in favor of a common construction for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), instantiated with algorithms such as AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305. It differs from TLS 1.2 in its use of padding, associated data and nonces. It also encrypts the content-type used to multiplex between sub-protocols. New protocol features such as early application data (0-RTT and 0.5-RTT) and late handshake messages require additional keys and a more general model of stateful encryption. We build and verify a reference implementation of the TLS record layer and its cryptographic algorithms in F*, a dependently typed language where security and functional guarantees can be specified as pre-and post-conditions. We reduce the high-level security of the record layer to cryptographic assumptions on its ciphers. Each step in the reduction is verified by typing an F* module, for each step that involves a cryptographic assumption, this module precisely captures the corresponding game. We first verify the functional correctness and injectivity properties of our implementations of one-time MAC algorithms (Poly1305 and GHASH) and provide a generic proof of their security given these two properties. We show the security of a generic AEAD construction built from any secure one-time MAC and PRF. We extend AEAD, first to stream encryption, then to length-hiding, multiplexed encryption. Finally, we build a security model of the record layer against an adversary that controls the TLS sub-protocols. We compute concrete security bounds for the AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM, and CHACHA20_POLY1305 ciphersuites, and derive recommended limits on sent data before re-keying. We plug our implementation of the record layer into the miTLS library, confirm that they interoperate with Chrome and Firefox, and report initial performance results. Combining our functional correctness, security, and experimental results, we conclude that the new TLS record layer (as described in RFCs and cryptographic standards) is provably secure, and we provide its first verified implementation.