Papers tagged as Attacks
  1. The State of the Uniform: Attacks on Encrypted Databases Beyond the Uniform Query Distribution 2020 Attacks EncryptedDatabases Oakland
    Evgenios M. Kornaropoulos and Charalampos Papamanthou and Roberto Tamassia

    Recent foundational work on leakage-based attacks on encrypted databases has broadened our understanding of what an adversary can accomplish with a standard leakage profile. Nevertheless, all known value reconstruction attacks succeed under strong assumptions that may not hold in the real world. The most prevalent assumption is that queries should be issued uniformly at random by the client. We present the first value reconstruction attacks for encrypted databases without any assumptions about the query or data distribution. Our approach uses the search pattern leakage, which exists in all known structured encryption schemes but has not been effectively utilized so far. At the core of our method lies a support size estimator, a technique that utilizes the repetition of search tokens with the same response to estimate distances between encrypted values without any assumptions about the underlying distribution. We develop distribution-agnostic reconstruction attacks for both range queries and k-nearest-neighbor (k-NN) queries based on information extracted from the search pattern leakage. Our new range attack follows a different algorithmic approach than state-of-the-art attacks, which are fine-tuned to succeed under the uniform queries. Instead, we reconstruct plaintext values under a variety of skewed query distributions and even outperform the accuracy of previous approaches under uniform query distribution. Our new k-NN attack succeeds with far fewer samples than a previously proposed attack and scales to much larger values of k. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks by experimentally testing them on a wide range of query distributions and database densities, both unknown to the adversary.

  2. SoK: Understanding the Prevailing Security Vulnerabilities in TrustZone-assisted TEE Systems 2020 Attacks IntelSGX Oakland TEE
    David Cerdeira, Centro Algoritmi, Pedro Fonseca, and Sandro Pinto

    Hundreds of millions of mobile devices worldwide rely on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) built with Arm TrustZone for the protection of security-critical applications (e.g., DRM) and operating system (OS) components (e.g., Android keystore). TEEs are often assumed to be highly secure; however, over the past years, TEEs have been successfully attacked multiple times, with highly damaging impact across various platforms. Unfortunately, these attacks have been possible by the presence of security flaws in TEE systems. In this paper, we aim to understand which types of vulnerabilities and limitations affect existing TrustZone-assisted TEE systems, what are the main challenges to build them correctly, and what contributions can be borrowed from the research community to overcome them. To this end, we present a security analysis of popular TrustZone-assisted TEE systems (targeting Cortex-A processors) developed by Qualcomm, Trustonic, Huawei, Nvidia, and Linaro. By studying publicly documented exploits and vulnerabilities as well as by reverse engineering the TEE firmware, we identified several critical vulnerabilities across existing systems which makes it legitimate to raise reasonable concerns about the security of commercial TEE implementations

  3. Pseudorandom Black Swans: Cache Attacks on CTR_DRBG 2020 Attacks Oakland RandomnessGeneration SideChannels
    Shaanan Cohney and Andrew Kwong and Shachar Paz and Daniel Genkin and Nadia Heninger and Eyal Ronen and Yuval Yarom

    Modern cryptography requires the ability to securely generate pseudorandom numbers. However, despite decades of work on side channel attacks, there is little discussion of their application to pseudorandom number generators (PRGs). In this work we set out to address this gap, empirically evaluating the side channel resistance of common PRG implementations. We find that hard-learned lessons about side channel leakage from encryption primitives have not been applied to PRGs, at all levels of abstraction. At the design level, the NIST-recommended CTR_DRBG design does not have forward security if an attacker is able to compromise the state via a side-channel attack. At the primitive level, popular implementations of CTR_DRBG such as OpenSSL’s FIPS module and NetBSD’s kernel use leaky T-table AES as their underlying block cipher, enabling cache side-channel attacks. Finally, we find that many implementations make parameter choices that enable an attacker to fully exploit the side-channel attack in a realistic scenario and recover secret keys from TLS connections. We empirically demonstrate our attack in two scenarios. In the first, we carry out an asynchronous cache attack that recovers the private state from vulnerable CTR_DRBG implementations under realistic conditions to recover long-term authentication keys when the attacker is a party in the TLS connection. In the second scenario, we show that an attacker can exploit the high temporal resolution provided by Intel SGX to carry out a blind attack to recover CTR_DRBG’s state within three AES encryptions, without viewing output, and thus to decrypt passively collected TLS connections from the victim.

  4. Practical Traffic Analysis Attacks on Secure Messaging Applications 2020 Attacks NDSS SecureMessaging
    Alireza Bahramali, Ramin Soltani, Amir Houmansadr, Dennis Goeckel, Don Towsley

    Instant Messaging (IM) applications like Telegram, Signal, and WhatsApp have become extremely popular in recent years. Unfortunately, such IM services have been targets of continuous governmental surveillance and censorship, as these services are home to public and private communication channels on socially and politically sensitive topics. To protect their clients, popular IM services deploy state-of-the-art encryption mechanisms. In this paper, we show that despite the use of advanced encryption, popular IM applications leak sensitive information about their clients to adversaries who merely monitor their encrypted IM traffic, with no need for leveraging any software vulnerabilities of IM applications. Specifically, we devise traffic analysis attacks that enable an adversary to identify administrators as well as members of target IM channels (e.g., forums) with high accuracies. We believe that our study demonstrates a significant, real-world threat to the users of such services given the increasing attempts by oppressive governments at cracking down controversial IM channels.
    We demonstrate the practicality of our traffic analysis attacks through extensive experiments on real-world IM communications. We show that standard countermeasure techniques such as adding cover traffic can degrade the effectiveness of the attacks we introduce in this paper. We hope that our study will encourage IM providers to integrate effective traffic obfuscation countermeasures into their software. In the meantime, we have designed and deployed an open-source, publicly available countermeasure system, called IMProxy, that can be used by IM clients with no need for any support from IM providers. We have demonstrated the effectiveness of IMProxy through experiments.

  5. Better Concrete Security for Half-Gates Garbling (in the Multi-Instance Setting) 2020 2PC Attacks Crypto GarbledCircuits
    Chun Guo and Jonathan Katz and Xiao Wang and Chenkai Weng and Yu Yu

    We study the concrete security of high-performance implementations of half-gates garbling, which all rely on (hardware-accelerated)~AES. We find that current instantiations using k-bit wire labels can be completely broken—in the sense that the circuit evaluator learns all the inputs of the circuit garbler—in time O(2k/C), where C is the total number of (non-free) gates that are garbled, possibly across multiple independent executions. The attack can be applied to existing circuit-garbling libraries using k=80 when C≈109, and would require 267 machine-months and cost about USD 3500 to implement on the Google Cloud Platform. Since the attack can be entirely parallelized, the attack could be carried out in about a month using \approx 250 machines.

    With this as our motivation, we seek a way to instantiate the hash function in the half-gates scheme so as to achieve better concrete security. We present a construction based on AES that achieves optimal security in the single-instance setting (when only a single circuit is garbled). We also show how to modify the half-gates scheme so that its concrete security does not degrade in the multi-instance setting. Our modified scheme is as efficient as prior work in networks with up to 2 Gbps bandwidth.

  6. Comparing the difficulty of factorization and discrete logarithm: a 240-digit experiment 2020 Attacks Crypto PublicKeyEncryption
    F. Boudot and P. Gaudry and A. Guillevic and N. Heninger and E. Thomé and P. Zimmermann

    We report on two new records: the factorization of RSA-240, a 795-bit number, and a discrete logarithm computation over a 795-bit prime field. Previous records were the factorization of RSA-768 in 2009 and a 768-bit discrete logarithm computation in 2016. Our two computations at the 795-bit level were done using the same hardware and software, and show that computing a discrete logarithm is not much harder than a factorization of the same size. Moreover, thanks to algorithmic variants and well-chosen parameters, our computations were significantly less expensive than anticipated based on previous records.

    The last page of this paper also reports on the factorization of RSA-250.

  7. Improved Differential-Linear Attacks with Applications to ARX Ciphers 2020 Attacks Cryptanalysis Crypto SymmetricKey
    Christof Beierle and Gregor Leander and Yosuke Todo

    We present several improvements to the framework of differential-linear attacks with a special focus on ARX ciphers. As a demonstration of their impact, we apply them to Chaskey and ChaCha and we are able to significantly improve upon the best attacks published so far.

  8. Cryptanalysis of LEDAcrypt 2020 Attacks Cryptanalysis Crypto PQC SymmetricKey
    Daniel Apon and Ray Perlner and Angela Robinson and Paolo Santini

    We report on the concrete cryptanalysis of LEDAcrypt, a 2nd Round candidate in NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization process and one of 17 encryption schemes that remain as candidates for near-term standardization. LEDAcrypt consists of a public-key encryption scheme built from the McEliece paradigm and a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) built from the Niederreiter paradigm, both using a quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check (QC-LDPC) code.

    In this work, we identify a large class of extremely weak keys and provide an algorithm to recover them. For example, we demonstrate how to recover 1 in 2^47.72 of LEDAcrypt’s keys using only 2^18.72 guesses at the 256-bit security level. This is a major, practical break of LEDAcrypt.

    Further, we demonstrate a continuum of progressively less weak keys (from extremely weak keys up to all keys) that can be recovered in substantially less work than previously known. This demonstrates that the imperfection of LEDAcrypt is fundamental to the system’s design.

  9. Cryptanalysis Results on Spook 2020 Attacks Cryptanalysis Crypto Lightweight SymmetricKey
    Patrick Derbez and Paul Huynh and Virginie Lallemand and María Naya-Plasencia and Léo Perrin and André Schrottenloher

    Spook is one of the 32 candidates that has made it to the second round of the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standardization process, and is particularly interesting since it proposes differential side channel resistance. In this paper, we present practical distinguishers of the full 6-step version of the underlying permutations of Spook, namely Shadow-512 and Shadow-384, solving challenges proposed by the designers on the permutation. We also propose practical forgeries with 4-step Shadow for the S1P mode of operation in the nonce misuse scenario, which is allowed by the CIML2 security game considered by the authors. All the results presented in this paper have been implemented.

  10. A key-recovery timing attack on post-quantum primitives using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation and its application on FrodoKEM 2020 Attacks Crypto PQC
    Qian Guo and Thomas Johansson and Alexander Nilsson

    In the implementation of post-quantum primitives, it is well known that all computations that handle secret information need to be implemented to run in constant time. Using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation or any of its different variants, a CPA-secure primitive can be converted into an IND-CCA secure KEM. In this paper we show that although the transformation does not handle secret information apart from calls to the CPA-secure primitive, it has to be implemented in constant time. Namely, if the ciphertext comparison step in the transformation is leaking side-channel information, we can launch a key-recovery attack. Several proposed schemes in round 2 of the NIST post-quantum standardization project are susceptible to the proposed attack and we develop and show the details of the attack on one of them, being FrodoKEM. It is implemented on the reference implementation of FrodoKEM, which is claimed to be secure against all timing attacks. Experiments show that the attack code is able to extract the secret key for all security levels using about 2^30 decapsulation calls.

  11. LWE with Side Information: Attacks and Concrete Security Estimation 2020 Attacks Crypto Lattices PQC SideChannels
    Dana Dachman-Soled and Léo Ducas and Huijing Gong and Mélissa Rossi

    We propose a framework for cryptanalysis of lattice-based schemes, when side information—in the form of ``hints’’— about the secret and/or error is available. Our framework generalizes the so-called primal lattice reduction attack, and allows the progressive integration of hints before running a final lattice reduction step. Our techniques for integrating hints include sparsifying the lattice, projecting onto and intersecting with hyperplanes, and/or altering the distribution of the secret vector. Our main contribution is to propose a toolbox and a methodology to integrate such hints into lattice reduction attacks and to predict the performance of those lattice attacks with side information.

    While initially designed for side-channel information, our framework can also be used in other cases: exploiting decryption failures, or simply exploiting constraints imposed by certain schemes (LAC, Round5, NTRU).

    We implement a Sage 9.0 toolkit to actually mount such attacks with hints when computationally feasible, and to predict their performances on larger instances. We provide several end-to-end application examples, such as an improvement of a single trace attack on Frodo by Bos et al (SAC 2018). In particular, our work can estimates security loss even given very little side information, leading to a smooth measurement/computation trade-off for side-channel attacks.

  12. Quantifying the Security Cost of Migrating Protocols to Practice 2020 Attacks Crypto SymmetricKey
    Christopher Patton and Thomas Shrimpton

    We give a framework for relating the concrete security of a “reference” protocol (say, one appearing in an academic paper) to that of some derived, “real” protocol (say, appearing in a cryptographic standard). It is based on the indifferentiability framework of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein (MRH), whose application has been exclusively focused upon non-interactive cryptographic primitives, e.g., hash functions and Feistel networks. Our extension of MRH is supported by a clearly defined execution model and two composition lemmata, all formalized in a modern pseudocode language. Together, these allow for precise statements about game-based security properties of cryptographic objects (interactive or not) at various levels of abstraction. As a real-world application, we design and prove tight security bounds for a potential TLS 1.3 extension that integrates the SPAKE2 password-authenticated key-exchange into the handshake.

  13. Implementing Grover oracles for quantum key search on AES and LowMC 2020 Attacks Eurocrypt QuantumAttacks SymmetricKey
    Samuel Jaques, Michael Naehrig, Martin Roetteler and Fernando Virdia

    Grover’s search algorithm gives a quantum attack against block ciphers by searching for a key that matches a small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. This attack uses O(N−−√) calls to the cipher to search a key space of size N. Previous work in the specific case of AES derived the full gate cost by analyzing quantum circuits for the cipher, but focused on minimizing the number of qubits. In contrast, we study the cost of quantum key search attacks under a depth restriction and introduce techniques that reduce the oracle depth, even if it requires more qubits. As cases in point, we design quantum circuits for the block ciphers AES and LowMC. Our circuits give a lower overall attack cost in both the gate count and depth-times-width cost models. In NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization process, security categories are defined based on the concrete cost of quantum key search against AES. We present new, lower cost estimates for each category, so our work has immediate implications for the security assessment of post-quantum cryptography. As part of this work, we release Q# implementations of the full Grover oracle for AES-128, -192, -256 and for the three LowMC instantiations used in \picnic, including unit tests and code to reproduce our quantum resource estimates. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first two such full implementations and automatic resource estimations.

  14. Big Numbers - Big Troubles: Systematically Analyzing Nonce Leakage in (EC)DSA Implementations 2020 Attacks Implementation SideChannels Signatures Usenix
    Samuel Weiser, David Schrammel, Lukas Bodner, and Raphael Spreitzer

    Side-channel attacks exploiting (EC)DSA nonce leakage easily lead to full key recovery. Although (EC)DSA implementations have already been hardened against side-channel leakage using the constant-time paradigm, the long-standing cat-and-mouse-game of attacks and patches continues. In particular, current code review is prone to miss less obvious side channels hidden deeply in the call stack. To solve this problem, a systematic study of nonce leakage is necessary. We present a systematic analysis of nonce leakage in cryptographic implementations. In particular, we expand DATA, an open-source side-channel analysis framework, to detect nonce leakage. Our analysis identified multiple unknown nonce leakage vulnerabilities across all essential computation steps involving nonces. Among others, we uncover inherent problems in Bignumber implementations that break claimed constant-time guarantees of (EC)DSA implementations if secrets are close to a word boundary. We found that lazy resizing of Bignumbers in OpenSSL and LibreSSL yields a highly accurate and easily exploitable side channel, which has been acknowledged with two CVEs. Surprisingly, we also found a tiny but expressive leakage in the constant-time scalar multiplication of OpenSSL and BoringSSL. Moreover, in the process of reporting and patching, we identified newly introduced leakage with the support of our tool, thus preventing another attack-patch cycle. We open-source our tool, together with an intuitive graphical user interface we developed.

  15. Attacking GlobalPlatform SCP02-compliant Smart Cards Using a Padding Oracle Attack 2018 Attacks CHES Hardware
    Gildas Avoine, Loïc Ferreira

    We describe in this paper how to perform a padding oracle attack against
    the GlobalPlatform SCP02 protocol. SCP02 is implemented in smart cards and
    used by transport companies, in the banking world and by mobile network operators
    (UICC/SIM cards). The attack allows an adversary to efficiently retrieve plaintext
    bytes from an encrypted data field. We provide results of our experiments done
    with 10 smart cards from six different card manufacturers, and show that, in our
    experimental setting, the attack is fully practical. Given that billions SIM cards are
    produced every year, the number of affected cards, although difficult to estimate,
    is potentially high. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful attack
    against SCP02.

  16. Revisiting Leakage Abuse Attacks 2019 Attacks EncryptedDatabases SearchableEncryption
    Laura Blackstone, Seny Kamara, Tarik Moataz

    Encrypted search algorithms (ESA) are cryptographic algorithms that support search over encrypted data. ESAs can be designed with various primitives including searchable/structured symmetric encryption (SSE/STE) and oblivious RAM (ORAM). Leakage abuse attacks attempt to recover client queries using knowledge of the client’s data. An important parameter for any leakage-abuse attack is its known-data rate; that is, the fraction of client data that must be known to the adversary.

    In this work, we revisit leakage abuse attacks in several ways. We first highlight some practical limitations and assumptions underlying the well-known IKK (Islam et al. NDSS ’12) and Count (Cash et al., CCS ’15) attacks. We then design four new leakage-abuse attacks that rely on much weaker assumptions. Three of these attacks are volumetric in the sense that they only exploit leakage related to document sizes. In particular, this means that they work not only on SSE/STE-based ESAs but also against ORAM-based solutions. We also introduce two volumetric injection attack which use adversarial file additions to recover queries even from ORAM-based solutions. As far as we know, these are the first attacks of their kind.

    We evaluated all our attacks empirically and considered many experimental settings including different data collections, query selectivities, known-data rates, query space size and composition. From our experiments, we observed that the only setting that resulted in reasonable recovery rates under practical assumptions was the case of high-selectivity queries with a leakage profile that includes the response identity pattern (i.e., the identifiers of the matching documents) and the volume pattern (i.e., the size of the matching documents). All other attack scenarios either failed or relied on unrealistic assumptions (e.g., very high known-data rates). For this specific setting, we propose several suggestions and countermeasures including the use of schemes like PBS (Kamara et al, CRYPTO ’18), VLH/AVLH (Kamara and Moataz, Eurocrypt ’19 ), or the use of padding techniques like the ones recently proposed by Bost and Fouque (Bost and Fouque, IACR ePrint 2017/1060).

  17. The State of the Uniform: Attacks on Encrypted Databases Beyond the Uniform Query Distribution 2020 Attacks EncryptedDatabases Oakland SearchableEncryption
    Evgenios M. Kornaropoulos and Charalampos Papamanthou and Roberto Tamassia

    Recent foundational work on leakage-abuse attacks on encrypted databases has broadened our understanding of what an adversary can accomplish with a standard leakage profile. Nevertheless, all known value reconstruction attacks succeed under strong assumptions that may not hold in the real world. The most prevalent assumption is that queries are issued uniformly at random by the client. We present the first value reconstruction attacks that succeed without any knowledge about the query or data distribution. Our approach uses the search-pattern leakage, which exists in all known structured encryption schemes but has not been fully exploited so far. At the core of our method lies a support size estimator, a technique that utilizes the repetition of search tokens with the same response to estimate distances between encrypted values without any assumptions about the underlying distribution. We develop distribution-agnostic reconstruction attacks for both range queries and k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) queries based on information extracted from the search-pattern leakage. Our new range attack follows a different algorithmic approach than state-of-the-art attacks, which are fine-tuned to succeed under the uniformly distributed queries. Instead, we reconstruct plaintext values under a variety of skewed query distributions and even outperform the accuracy of previous approaches under the uniform query distribution. Our new k-NN attack succeeds with far fewer samples than previous attacks and scales to much larger values of k. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks by experimentally testing them on a wide range of query distributions and database densities, both unknown to the adversary.

  18. DROWN: Breaking TLS using SSLv2 2016 Attacks KeyExchange Measurement Network Protocols TLS Usenix
    Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel, Juraj Somorovsky, Nadia Heninger, Maik Dankel, Jens Steube, Luke Valenta, David Adrian, J. Alex Halderman, Viktor Dukhovni, Emilia Käsper, Shaanan Cohney, Susanne Engels, Christof Paar, and Yuval Shavitt

    We present DROWN, a novel cross-protocol attack on TLS that uses a server supporting SSLv2 as an oracle to decrypt modern TLS connections.
    We introduce two versions of the attack. The more general form exploits multiple unnoticed protocol flaws in SSLv2 to develop a new and stronger variant of the Bleichenbacher RSA padding-oracle attack. To decrypt a 2048-bit RSA TLS ciphertext, an attacker must observe
    1,000 TLS handshakes, initiate 40,000 SSLv2 connections, and perform 2^50 offline work. The victim client never initiates SSLv2 connections. We implemented the attack and can decrypt a TLS 1.2 handshake using 2048-bit RSA in under 8 hours, at a cost of $440 on Amazon EC2. Using Internet-wide scans, we find that 33% of all HTTPS servers and 22% of those with browser-trusted certificates are vulnerable to this protocol-level attack due
    to widespread key and certificate reuse.
    For an even cheaper attack, we apply our new techniques together with a newly discovered vulnerability in OpenSSL that was present in releases from 1998 to early 2015. Given an unpatched SSLv2 server to use as an oracle, we can decrypt a TLS ciphertext in one minute on a single CPU - fast enough to enable man-in-the-middle attacks against modern browsers. We find that 26% of HTTPS servers are vulnerable to this attack.
    We further observe that the QUIC protocol is vulnerable to a variant of our attack that allows an attacker to impersonate a server indefinitely after performing as few as 2^17 SSLv2 connections and 2^58 offline work.
    We conclude that SSLv2 is not only weak, but actively harmful to the TLS ecosystem.

  19. Economy Class Crypto: Exploring Weak Cipher Usage in Avionic Communications via ACARS 2017 Attacks FinancialCryptography PhysicalSystems
    Matthew Smith, Daniel Moser, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic

    Recent research has shown that a number of existing wireless avionic systems lack encryption and are thus vulnerable to eavesdropping and message injection attacks. The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is no exception to this rule with 99% of the traffic being sent in plaintext. However, a small portion of the traffic coming mainly from privately-owned and government aircraft is encrypted, indicating a stronger requirement for security and privacy by those users. In this paper, we take a closer look at this protected communication and analyze the cryptographic solution being used. Our results show that the cipher used for this encryption is a mono-alphabetic substitution cipher, broken with little effort. We assess the impact on privacy and security to its unassuming users by characterizing months of real-world data, decrypted by breaking the cipher and recovering the keys. Our results show that the decrypted data leaks privacy sensitive information including existence, intent and status of aircraft owners.

  20. Release the Kraken: New KRACKs in the 802.11 Standard 2018 Attacks CCS CryptoStandards
    Mathy Vanhoef and Frank Piessens

    We improve key reinstallation attacks (KRACKs) against 802.11 by generalizing known attacks, systematically analyzing all handshakes, bypassing 802.11’s official countermeasure, auditing (flawed) patches, and enhancing attacks using implementation-specific bugs. Last year it was shown that several handshakes in the 802.11 standard were vulnerable to key reinstallation attacks. These attacks manipulate handshake messages to reinstall an already-in-use key, leading to both nonce reuse and replay attacks. We extend this work in several directions. First, we generalize attacks against the 4-way handshake so they no longer rely on hard-to-win race conditions, and we employ a more practical method to obtain the required man-in-the-middle (MitM) position. Second, we systematically investigate the 802.11 standard for key reinstallation vulnerabilities, and show that the Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS) and Tunneled direct-link setup PeerKey (TPK) handshakes are also vulnerable to key reinstallations. These handshakes increase roaming speed, and enable direct connectivity between clients, respectively. Third, we abuse Wireless Network Management (WNM) power-save features to trigger reinstallations of the group key. Moreover, we bypass (and improve) the official countermeasure of 802.11. In particular, group key reinstallations were still possible by combining EAPOL-Key and WNM-Sleep frames. We also found implementation-specific flaws that facilitate key reinstallations. For example, some devices reuse the ANonce and SNonce in the 4-way handshake, accept replayed message 4’s, or improperly install the group key. We conclude that preventing key reinstallations is harder than expected, and believe that (formally) modeling 802.11 would help to better secure both implementations and the standard itself.

  21. Fast Authentication from Aggregate Signatures with Improved Security 2019 Attacks Cryptanalysis FinancialCryptography Signatures
    Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Rouzbeh Behnia and Attila A. Yavuz

    An attempt to derive signer-efficient digital signatures from aggregate signatures was made in a signature scheme referred to as Structure-free Compact Rapid Authentication (SCRA) (IEEE TIFS 2017). In this paper, we first mount a practical universal forgery attack against the NTRU instantiation of SCRA by observing only 8161 signatures. Second, we propose a new signature scheme (FAAS), which transforms any single-signer aggregate signature scheme into a signer-efficient scheme. We show two efficient instantiations of FAAS, namely, FAAS-NTRU and FAAS-RSA, both of which achieve high computational efficiency. Our experiments confirmed that FAAS schemes achieve up to 100x faster signature generation compared to their underlying schemes. Moreover, FAAS schemes eliminate some of the costly operations such as Gaussian sampling, rejection sampling, and exponentiation at the signature generation that are shown to be susceptible to side-channel attacks. This enables FAAS schemes to enhance the security and efficiency of their underlying schemes. Finally, we prove that FAAS schemes are secure (in random oracle model), and open-source both our attack and FAAS implementations for public testing purposes.

  22. Practical attacks against the Walnut digital signature scheme 2018 Asiacrypt Attacks Cryptanalysis PQC Signatures
    Ward Beullens and Simon R. Blackburn

    Recently, NIST started the process of standardizing quantum- resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. WalnutDSA, the subject of this paper, is one of the 20 proposed signature schemes that are being considered for standardization. Walnut relies on a one-way function called E-Multiplication, which has a rich algebraic structure. This paper shows that this structure can be exploited to launch several practical attacks against the Walnut cryptosystem. The attacks work very well in practice; it is possible to forge signatures and compute equivalent secret keys for the 128-bit and 256-bit security parameters submitted to NIST in less than a second and in less than a minute respectively.

  23. From Collisions to Chosen-Prefix Collisions - Application to Full SHA-1 2019 Attacks Cryptanalysis Eurocrypt Hashing
    Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Peyrin

    A chosen-prefix collision attack is a stronger variant of a collision attack, where an arbitrary pair of challenge prefixes are turned into a collision. Chosen-prefix collisions are usually significantly harder to produce than (identical-prefix) collisions, but the practical impact of such an attack is much larger. While many cryptographic constructions rely on collision-resistance for their security proofs, collision attacks are hard to turn into a break of concrete protocols, because the adversary has limited control over the colliding messages. On the other hand, chosen-prefix collisions have been shown to break certificates (by creating a rogue CA) and many internet protocols (TLS, SSH, IPsec).

    In this article, we propose new techniques to turn collision attacks into chosen-prefix collision attacks. Our strategy is composed of two phases: first, a birthday search that aims at taking the random chaining variable difference (due to the chosen-prefix model) to a set of pre-defined target differences. Then, using a multi-block approach, carefully analysing the clustering effect, we map this new chaining variable difference to a colliding pair of states using techniques developed for collision attacks.

    We apply those techniques to MD5 and SHA1, and obtain improved attacks. In particular, we have a chosen-prefix collision attack against SHA1 with complexity between 266.9 and 269.4 (depending on assumptions about the cost of finding near-collision blocks), while the best-known attack has complexity 277.1. This is within a small factor of the complexity of the classical collision attack on SHA1 (estimated as 264.7). This represents yet another warning that industries and users have to move away from using SHA1 as soon as possible.

  24. Attacks Only Get Better: How to Break FF3 on Large Domains 2019 Attacks Eurocrypt FPE
    Viet Tung Hoang, David Miller and Ni Trieu

    We improve the attack of Durak and Vaudenay (CRYPTO’17) on NIST Format-Preserving Encryption standard FF3, reducing the running time from O(N5) to O(N17/6) for domain ZN×ZN. Concretely, DV’s attack needs about 2^50 operations to recover encrypted 6-digit PINs, whereas ours only spends about 2^30 operations. In realizing this goal, we provide a pedagogical example of how to use distinguishing attacks to speed up slide attacks. In addition, we improve the running time of DV’s known-plaintext attack on 4-round Feistel of domain ZN×ZN from O(N3) time to just O(N5/3) time. We also generalize our attacks to a general domain ZM×ZN, allowing one to recover encrypted SSNs using about 2^50 operations. Finally, we provide some proof-of-concept implementations to empirically validate our results.

  25. Fast Near Collision Attack on the Grain v1 Stream Cipher 2018 Attacks Cryptanalysis Eurocrypt
    Bin Zhang, Chao Xu, and Willi Meier

    Modern stream ciphers often adopt a large internal state to resist various attacks, where the cryptanalysts have to deal with a large number of variables when mounting state recovery attacks. In this paper, we propose a general new cryptanalytic method on stream ciphers, called fast near collision attack, to address this situation. It combines a near collision property with the divide-and-conquer strategy so that only subsets of the internal state, associated with different keystream vectors, are recovered first and merged carefully later to retrieve the full large internal state. A self-contained method is introduced and improved to derive the target subset of the internal state from the partial state difference efficiently. As an application, we propose a new key recovery attack on Grain v1, one of the 7 finalists selected by the eSTREAM project, in the single-key setting. Both the pre-computation and the online phases are tailored according to its internal structure, to provide an attack for any fixed IV in 275.7 cipher ticks after the pre-computation of 28.1 cipher ticks, given 228-bit memory and about 219 keystream bits. Practical experiments on Grain v1 itself whenever possible and on a 80-bit reduced version confirmed our results.