1. Real Hidden Identity-Based Signatures 2017 AnonymousCredentials FinancialCryptography Privacy fc17.ifca.ai
    Sherman S.M. Chow, Haibin Zhang, Tao Zhang

    Group signature allows members to issue signatures on be-half of the group anonymously in normal circumstances. When the need arises, an opening authority (OA) can open a signature and reveal its true signer. Yet, many constructions require not only the OA’s secret key but also a member database (cf. a public-key repository) in this opening.This “secret members list” put the anonymity of members at risk.To resolve this “anonymity catch-22” issue, Kiayias and Zhou proposed hidden identity-based signatures (Financial Crypt. 2007), where the opening just takes in the OA’s secret key and outputs the signer identity. The membership list can be hidden from the OA since there is no member-ship list whatsoever. However, their constructions suffer from efficiency problem.This paper aims to realize the vision of Kiayias and Zhou for real, that is,an efficient construction which achieves the distinctive feature of hidden identity-based signatures. Moreover, our construction is secure against concurrent attack, and easily extensible with linkability such that any double authentication can be publicly detected. Both features are especially desirable in Internet-based services which allow anonymous authentication with revocation to block any misbehaving user. We believe our work will improve the usability of group signature and its variant.

  2. An efficient self-blindable attribute-based credential scheme 2017 AnonymousCredentials FinancialCryptography eprint.iacr.org
    Sietse Ringers, Eric Verheul, Jaap-Henk Hoepman

    An attribute-based credential scheme allows a user, given a set of attributes, to prove ownership of these attributes to a verifier, voluntarily disclosing some of them while keeping the others secret. A number of such schemes exist, of which some additionally provide unlinkability: that is, when the same attributes were disclosed in two transactions, it is not possible to tell if one and the same or two different credentials were involved. Recently full-fledged implementations of such schemes on smart cards have emerged; however, these need to compromise the security level to achieve reasonable transaction speeds. In this paper we present a new unlinkable attribute-based credential scheme with a full security proof, using a known hardness assumption in the standard model. Defined on elliptic curves, the scheme involves bilinear pairings but only on the verifier’s side, making it very efficient both in terms of speed and size on the user’s side.

  3. Practical UC-Secure Delegatable Credentials with Attributes and Their Application to Blockchain 2017 AnonymousCredentials Blockchains CCS UC acmccs.github.io
    Jan Camenisch, Manu Drijvers, and Maria Dubovitskaya

    Certification of keys and attributes is in practice typically realized by a hierarchy of issuers. Revealing the full chain of issuers for certificate verification, however, can be a privacy issue since it can leak sensitive information about the issuer’s organizational structure or about the certificate owner. Delegatable anonymous credentials solve this problem and allow one to hide the full delegation (issuance) chain, providing privacy during both delegation and presentation of certificates. However, the existing delegatable credentials schemes are not efficient enough for practical use.


    In this paper, we present the first hierarchical (or delegatable) anonymous credential system that is practical. To this end, we provide a surprisingly simple ideal functionality for delegatable credentials and present a generic construction that we prove secure in the UC model. We then give a concrete instantiation using a recent pairing-based signature scheme by Groth and describe a number of optimizations and efficiency improvements that can be made when implementing our concrete scheme. The latter might be of independent interest for other pairing-based schemes as well. Finally, we report on an implementation of our scheme in the context of transaction authentication for blockchain, and provide concrete performance figures.

  4. Updatable Anonymous Credentials and Applications to Incentive Systems 2019 AnonymousCredentials CCS eprint.iacr.org
    Johannes Blömer, Jan Bobolz, Denis Diemert and Fabian Eidens

    In this paper, we introduce updatable anonymous credential systems (UACS) and use them to construct a new privacy-preserving incentive system. In a UACS, a user holding a credential certifying some attributes can interact with the corresponding issuer to update his attributes. During this, the issuer knows which update function is run, but does not learn the user’s previous attributes. Hence the update process preserves anonymity of the user. One example for a class of update functions are additive updates of integer attributes, where the issuer increments an unknown integer attribute value v by some known value k. This kind of update is motivated by an application of UACS to incentive systems. Users in an incentive system can anonymously accumulate points, e.g. in a shop at checkout, and spend them later, e.g. for a discount.

  5. Coconut: Threshold Issuance Selective Disclosure Credentials with Applications to Distributed Ledgers 2019 AnonymousCredentials Blockchains NDSS Privacy ndss-symposium.org
    Alberto Sonnino and Mustafa Al-Bassam and Shehar Bano and Sarah Meiklejohn and George Danezis

    Coconut is a novel selective disclosure credential scheme supporting distributed threshold issuance, public and private attributes, re-randomization, and multiple unlinkable selective attribute revelations. Coconut integrates with Blockchains to ensure confidentiality, authenticity and availability even when a subset of credential issuing authorities are malicious or offline. We implement and evaluate a generic Coconut smart contract library for Chainspace and Ethereum; and present three applications related to anonymous payments, electronic petitions, and distribution of proxies for censorship resistance.


    Coconut uses short and computationally efficient credentials, and our evaluation shows that most Coconut cryptographic primitives take just a few milliseconds on average, with verification taking the longest time (10 milliseconds).