1. Pool: Scalable On-Demand Secure Computation Service against Malicious Adversaries 2017 CCS Implementation MPC
    Ruiyu Zhu, Yan Huang, and Darion Cassel
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    author = {Zhu, Ruiyu and Huang, Yan and Cassel, Darion},
    title = {Pool: Scalable On-Demand Secure Computation Service Against Malicious Adversaries},
    year = {2017},
    isbn = {9781450349468},
    publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
    address = {New York, NY, USA},
    url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134070},
    doi = {10.1145/3133956.3134070},
    booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
    pages = {245–257},
    numpages = {13},
    keywords = {scalable actively-secure computation},
    location = {Dallas, Texas, USA},
    series = {CCS ’17}

This paper considers the problem of running a long-term on-demand service for executing actively-secure computations. We examined state-of-the-art tools and implementations for actively-secure computation and identified a set of key features indispensable to offer meaningful service like this. Since no satisfactory tools exist for the purpose, we developed Pool, a new tool for building and executing actively-secure computation protocols at extreme scales with nearly zero offline delay. With Pool, we are able to obliviously execute, for the first time, reactive computations like ORAM in the malicious threat model. Many technical benefits of Pool can be attributed to the concept of pool-based cut-and-choose. We show with experiments that this idea has significantly improved the scalability and usability of JIMU, a state-of-the-art LEGO protocol.