1. New Constructions for Forward and Backward Private Symmetric Searchable Encryption 2018 CCS SearchableEncryption SymmetricKey
    Javad Ghareh Chamani, Dimitrios Papadopoulos, Charalampos Papamanthou, and Rasool Jalili
    [View PDF on obj.umiacs.umd.edu]
    [Show BibTex Citation]

    @inproceedings{10.1145/3243734.3243833,
    author = {Ghareh Chamani, Javad and Papadopoulos, Dimitrios and Papamanthou, Charalampos and Jalili, Rasool},
    title = {New Constructions for Forward and Backward Private Symmetric Searchable Encryption},
    year = {2018},
    isbn = {9781450356930},
    publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
    address = {New York, NY, USA},
    url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243833},
    doi = {10.1145/3243734.3243833},
    booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
    pages = {1038–1055},
    numpages = {18},
    keywords = {cloud databases, searchable encryption, forward/backward privacy},
    location = {Toronto, Canada},
    series = {CCS ’18}
    }

We study the problem of dynamic symmetric searchable encryption. In that setting, it is crucial to minimize the information revealed to the server as a result of update operations (insertions and deletions). Two relevant privacy properties have been defined in that context: forward and backward privacy. The first makes it hard for the server to link an update operation with previous queries and has been extensively studied in the literature. The second limits what the server can learn about entries that were deleted from the database, from queries that happen after the deletion. Backward privacy was formally studied only recently (Bost et al., CCS 2017) in a work that introduced a formal definition with three variable types of leakage (Type-I to Type-III ordered from most to least secure), as well as the only existing schemes that satisfy this property. In this work, we introduce three novel constructions that improve previous results in multiple ways. The first scheme achieves Type-II backward privacy and our experimental evaluation shows it has 145-253X faster search computation times than previous constructions with the same leakage. Surprisingly, it is faster even than schemes with Type-III leakage which makes it the most efficient implementation of a forward and backward private scheme so far. The second one has search time that is asymptotically within a polylogarithmic multiplicative factor of the theoretical optimal (i.e., the result size of a search), and it achieves the strongest level of backward privacy (Type-I). All previous Type-I constructions require time that is at least linear in the total number of updates for the requested keywords, even the (arbitrarily many) previously deleted ones. Our final scheme improves upon the second one by reducing the number of roundtrips for a search at the cost of extra leakage (Type-III).

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