1. Untagging Tor: A Formal Treatment of Onion Encryption 2018 Attacks Eurocrypt SecureChannels Tor
    Jean Paul Degabriele and Martijn Stam
    [View PDF on eprint.iacr.org]
    [Show BibTex Citation]

    @misc{cryptoeprint:2018:162,
    author = {Jean Paul Degabriele and Martijn Stam},
    title = {Untagging Tor: A Formal Treatment of Onion Encryption},
    howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/162},
    year = {2018},
    note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/162}},
    }

Tor is a primary tool for maintaining anonymity online. It provides a low-latency, circuit-based, bidirectional secure channel between two parties through a network of onion routers, with the aim of obscuring exactly who is talking to whom, even to adversaries controlling part of the network. Tor relies heavily on cryptographic techniques, yet its onion encryption scheme is susceptible to tagging attacks (Fu and Ling, 2009), which allow an active adversary controlling the first and last node of a circuit to deanonymize with near-certainty. This contrasts with less active traffic correlation attacks, where the same adversary can at best deanonymize with high probability. The Tor project has been actively looking to defend against tagging attacks and its most concrete alternative is proposal 261, which specifies a new onion encryption scheme based on a variable-input-length tweakable cipher.

We provide a formal treatment of low-latency, circuit-based onion encryption, relaxed to the unidirectional setting, by expanding existing secure channel notions to the new setting and introducing circuit hiding to capture the anonymity aspect of Tor. We demonstrate that circuit hiding prevents tagging attacks and show proposal 261’s relay protocol is circuit hiding and thus resistant against tagging attacks.

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