1. One TPM to Bind Them All: Fixing TPM 2.0 for Provably Secure Anonymous Attestation 2017 Oakland RemoteAttestation TEE
    Jan Camenisch, Liqun Chen, Manu Drijvers, Anja Lehmann, David Novick, and Rainer Urian
    [View PDF on eprint.iacr.org]
    [Show BibTex Citation]

    @INPROCEEDINGS{7958616,
    author={J. {Camenisch} and L. {Chen} and M. {Drijvers} and A. {Lehmann} and D. {Novick} and R. {Urian}},
    booktitle={2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)},
    title={One TPM to Bind Them All: Fixing TPM 2.0 for Provably Secure Anonymous Attestation},
    year={2017},
    volume={},
    number={},
    pages={901-920},
    keywords={private key cryptography;trusted computing;provably secure anonymous attestation;trusted platform module;security chip;cryptographic keys management;remote attestation;Diffie-Hellman oracle;secret key;fraudulent TPM;attestation signature;TPM 2.0 interfaces;q-SDH-based anonymous attestation;LRSW-based anonymous attestation;Protocols;Privacy;Standards;Complexity theory;Cryptography;Elliptic curves},
    doi={10.1109/SP.2017.22},
    ISSN={2375-1207},
    month={May},
    }

The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is an international standard for a security chip that can be used for the management of cryptographic keys and for remote attestation. The specification of the most recent TPM 2.0 interfaces for direct anonymous attestation unfortunately has a number of severe shortcomings. First of all, they do not allow for security proofs (indeed, the published proofs are incorrect). Second, they provide a Diffie-Hellman oracle w.r.t. the secret key of the TPM, weakening the security and preventing forward anonymity of attestations. Fixes to these problems have been proposed, but they create new issues: they enable a fraudulent TPM to encode information into an attestation signature, which could be used to break anonymity or to leak the secret key. Furthermore, all proposed ways to remove the Diffie-Hellman oracle either strongly limit the functionality of the TPM or would require significant changes to the TPM 2.0 interfaces. In this paper we provide a better specification of the TPM 2.0 interfaces that addresses these problems and requires only minimal changes to the current TPM 2.0 commands. We then show how to use the revised interfaces to build g-SDH- and LRSW-based anonymous attestation schemes, and prove their security. We finally discuss how to obtain other schemes addressing different use cases such as key-binding for U-Prove and e-cash.

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