1. Implementing and Proving the TLS 1.3 Record Layer 2017 FormalVerification Oakland TLS
    A. Delignat-Lavaud, C. Fournet, M. Kohlweiss, J. Protzenko, A. Rastogi, N. Swamy, S. Zanella-Beguelin, K. Bhargavan, J. Pan, and J. K. Zinzindohoue
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    [Show BibTex Citation]

    @INPROCEEDINGS{7958593,
    author={A. {Delignat-Lavaud} and C. {Fournet} and M. {Kohlweiss} and J. {Protzenko} and A. {Rastogi} and N. {Swamy} and S. {Zanella-Beguelin} and K. {Bhargavan} and J. {Pan} and J. K. {Zinzindohoue}},
    booktitle={2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)},
    title={Implementing and Proving the TLS 1.3 Record Layer},
    year={2017},
    volume={},
    number={},
    pages={463-482},
    keywords={cryptographic protocols;demultiplexing;Internet;signal processing;TLS 1.3 record layer;internal subprotocols;signal stream termination;authenticated encryption with associated data;AEAD;handshake messages;cryptographic algorithms;F* module;multiplexed encryption;AES_128_GCM ciphersuites;AES_256_GCM ciphersuites;CHACHA20_POLY1305 ciphersuites;Encryption;Multiplexing;Protocols;Libraries;Ciphers;Security;Cryptography;Program Verification},
    doi={10.1109/SP.2017.58},
    ISSN={2375-1207},
    month={May},}

The record layer is the main bridge between TLS applications and internal sub-protocols. Its core functionality is an elaborate form of authenticated encryption: streams of messages for each sub-protocol (handshake, alert, and application data) are fragmented, multiplexed, and encrypted with optional padding to hide their lengths. Conversely, the sub-protocols may provide fresh keys or signal stream termination to the record layer. Compared to prior versions, TLS 1.3 discards obsolete schemes in favor of a common construction for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), instantiated with algorithms such as AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305. It differs from TLS 1.2 in its use of padding, associated data and nonces. It also encrypts the content-type used to multiplex between sub-protocols. New protocol features such as early application data (0-RTT and 0.5-RTT) and late handshake messages require additional keys and a more general model of stateful encryption. We build and verify a reference implementation of the TLS record layer and its cryptographic algorithms in F*, a dependently typed language where security and functional guarantees can be specified as pre-and post-conditions. We reduce the high-level security of the record layer to cryptographic assumptions on its ciphers. Each step in the reduction is verified by typing an F* module, for each step that involves a cryptographic assumption, this module precisely captures the corresponding game. We first verify the functional correctness and injectivity properties of our implementations of one-time MAC algorithms (Poly1305 and GHASH) and provide a generic proof of their security given these two properties. We show the security of a generic AEAD construction built from any secure one-time MAC and PRF. We extend AEAD, first to stream encryption, then to length-hiding, multiplexed encryption. Finally, we build a security model of the record layer against an adversary that controls the TLS sub-protocols. We compute concrete security bounds for the AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM, and CHACHA20_POLY1305 ciphersuites, and derive recommended limits on sent data before re-keying. We plug our implementation of the record layer into the miTLS library, confirm that they interoperate with Chrome and Firefox, and report initial performance results. Combining our functional correctness, security, and experimental results, we conclude that the new TLS record layer (as described in RFCs and cryptographic standards) is provably secure, and we provide its first verified implementation.

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