1. The use of TLS in Censorship Circumvention 2019 Censorship Measurement NDSS TLS
    Sergey Frolov and Eric Wustrow
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    author = {Sergey Frolov and Eric Wustrow},
    title = {The use of TLS in Censorship Circumvention},
    booktitle = {26th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, {NDSS}
    2019, San Diego, California, USA},
    year = {2019}

TLS, the Transport Layer Security protocol, has quickly become the most popular protocol on the Internet, already used to load over 70% of web pages in Mozilla Firefox. Due to its ubiquity, TLS is also a popular protocol for censorship circumvention tools, including Tor and Signal, among others.

However, the wide range of features supported in TLS makes it possible to distinguish implementations from one another by what set of cipher suites, elliptic curves, signature algorithms, and other extensions they support. Already, censors have used deep packet inspection (DPI) to identify and block popular circumven- tion tools based on the fingerprint of their TLS implementation.

In response, many circumvention tools have attempted to mimic popular TLS implementations such as browsers, but this technique has several challenges. First, it is burdensome to keep up with the rapidly-changing browser TLS implementations, and know what fingerprints would be good candidates to mimic. Second, TLS implementations can be difficult to mimic correctly, as they offer many features that may not be supported by the relatively lightweight libraries used in typical circumvention tools. Finally, dependency changes and updates to the underlying li- braries can silently impact what an application’s TLS fingerprint looks like, making it difficult for tools to control.

In this paper, we collect and analyze real-world TLS traffic from over 11.8 billion TLS connections over 9 months to identify a wide range of TLS client implementations actually used on the Internet. We use our data to analyze TLS implementations of several popular censorship circumvention tools, including Lantern, Psiphon, Signal, Outline, Tapdance, and Tor (Snowflake and meek). We find that the many of these tools use TLS configurations that are easily distinguishable from the real-world traffic they attempt to mimic, even when these tools have put effort into parroting popular TLS implementations.

To address this problem, we have developed a library, uTLS, that enables tool maintainers to automatically mimic other pop- ular TLS implementations. Using our real-world traffic dataset, we observe many popular TLS implementations we are able to correctly mimic with uTLS, and we describe ways our tool can more flexibly adopt to the dynamic TLS ecosystem with minimal manual effort.